In its latest report, issued Wednesday, by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR), the monitoring body found that although efforts have been made by government to fight corruption, much work still needs to be done.
SIGAR stated: “We found that the Afghan government has begun implementing its anticorruption strategy and other reforms, but questions remain regarding its ability to fully implement the strategy and demonstrate a lasting commitment to combatting corruption.”
The High Council released the anti-corruption strategy on October 12, 2017, achieving the first of its SMAF objectives, though it missed the mid-2017 deadline, the report stated.
After receiving a draft of this report, the Afghan government demonstrated on April 22, 2018, that all five revenue-generating ministries have publicly reported on their progress implementing their anti-corruption action plans.
“While the strategy is a positive step, it has weaknesses and it does not meet some international standards and best practices. Specifically, the strategy’s authors did not fully engage Afghan civil society organizations and ministries, even though some will be responsible for the strategy’s implementation.
“In addition, the strategy’s goals and benchmarks are not fully aligned. The strategy focuses primarily on 15 “priority” ministries but leaves the role of Afghanistan’s largest ministry, the Ministry of Defense, unclear. The strategy also does not fully incorporate Afghanistan’s other ongoing anti-corruption initiatives.
“Moreover, the strategy fails to call for the establishment of a permanent and fully independent anti-corruption organization to oversee, coordinate, and implement anti-corruption initiatives,” the report stated.
However, according to SIGAR, the Afghan government said in response to the draft report that it “took a number of conscious decisions that differed from international practice… We did this with our eyes wide open and with strategic intent, as we are very much aware of the [United Nations Convention Against Corruption] that recommends the creation of an independent anti-corruption body.”
SIGAR stated that by February 28, 2018, the Afghan government had met its self-imposed deadlines for only 2 of the 20 anti-corruption benchmarks that were due by that date.
“After receiving a draft of this report, the Afghan government completed an additional 12 benchmarks by May 14, 2018, bringing the total number of completed benchmarks to 14,” the report stated.
Similarly, despite a presidential order mandating that approximately 58 Afghan government entities create anti-corruption action plans, only 22 had done so as of February 2018. However, after receiving a draft of this report, the Afghan government showed that an additional 26 ministries had submitted action plans. Therefore, as of May 14, 2018, Afghan government entities had submitted 48 out of 58 anti-corruption action plans to the High Council.
SIGAR stated that in addition to developing its anti-corruption strategy, the Afghan government has reported progress in implementing anti-corruption and transparency initiatives such as updating the Penal Code.
However, SIGAR identified five major challenges that continue to limit the Afghan government’s ability to combat corruption. First, key anti-corruption institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) and Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) lack the capacity, resources, or security they need to perform their functions.
Second, despite efforts by the Afghan government to clarify the law, Afghan officials have differing opinions about when the MCTF’s detective role ends and when the Attorney General’s Office’s (AGO) investigative role begins, which has led to recurring conflict between these two organizations.
Third, Afghanistan’s law enforcement and judiciary often avoid investigating, prosecuting, and punishing powerful individuals.
Fourth, unqualified and potentially corrupt actors continue to operate in key Afghan anti-corruption institutions. For example, while the Department of Defense and the Afghan government conducted polygraph examinations of 139 ACJC, MCTF, and Ministry of Interior employees, with 53 of these employees failing, no follow-up polygraph examinations have been conducted.
In response to a draft of this report, senior Afghan government officials expressed willingness to conduct follow-on polygraph examinations. However, U.S. Embassy officials expressed concerns that even if additional rounds of testing occur, the AGO has not committed to acting on the results.
This, combined with reports of reprisals against reformers and whistleblowers, enables the capture of anti-corruption bodies by corrupt actors and discourages those who would challenge them.
Finally, US, international, and Afghan officials all expressed skepticism about Parliament’s willingness to support anti-corruption reforms, generally viewing it as a hindrance to the passage of anti-corruption reforms.